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Abstract 
 
Many models have been proposed to explain the opinion formation in a group of individuals; most 
of these models study the opinion propagation as the interaction between nodes/agents in a social 
network.  
The opinion formation is a very complex process and a realistic model should also take into account 
the important feedbacks that the opinions of the agents have on the structure of the social networks 
and on the characteristics of the opinion dynamics. 
In this paper we will show that associating to different agents different kind of interconnections and 
different interacting behaviour can lead to interesting scenarios, like the coexistence of several 
opinion clusters, namely pluralism. 
In our model agents have opinions uniformly and continuously distributed between two extremes. 
The social network is formed through a social aggregation mechanism including the segregation 
process of the extremists that results in many real communities. We show how this process affects 
the opinion dynamics in the whole society.  
In the opinion evolution we consider the different predisposition of single individuals to interact and 
to exchange opinion with each other; we associate to each individual a different tolerance threshold, 
depending on its own opinion: extremists are less willing to interact with individuals with strongly 
different opinions and to change significantly their ideas. 
A general result is obtained: when there is no interaction restriction, the opinion always converges 
to uniformity, but the same is happening whenever a strong segregation process of the extremists 
occurs. Only when extremists are forming clusters but these clusters keep interacting with the rest 
of the society, the survival of a wide opinion range is guaranteed. 
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1- Introduction 
 
There are a hierarchical and a horizontal way of opinion interaction. Opinion interaction is 
hierarchical when a single powerful agent is modifying the opinion of large sectors of the 
community – religion, media, governments often play this role. We are not going to consider this 
kind of interaction in our present work. Horizontal interaction occurs when the dialogue between 
two or more members of the community results in a change of the opinions of the debaters. This 
kind of opinion dynamics is the one we are going to study in the present work and is based on the 
principle of social influence: the more two persons interact, the more similar they become.  
Horizontal interaction has been considered less important in a society in which the opinion is spread 
by means of powerful centralized media. In recent years, however, a u-turn in the media structure 
has been observed: with the advent of the internet era, grassroots autonomous media structures 
emerged [1,2]; blogs, discussion lists, web communities are created, giving to the social influence 
principle a novel important role in the opinion evolution mechanism. 
 
Many mathematical models of the social influence principle have been proposed to describe how 
two persons make their opinions more similar after a discussion (for a review see [3]). Some 
models, like for example the Voter model [4,5], describe the exclusive choice between two 
possibilities, like the case of a referendum or of a single winner election. More refined descriptions 
like the Axelrod’s model [6] define the opinion as the resultant of a set of cultural traits. Finally the 
Deffuant model [7] describes the more complex setup of continuously differentiated opinions. In 
our model we adopt a particular form of this opinion distribution: there are two opposite positions 
and a continuous range of intermediate opinions. This could be for instance the distribution of the 
opinions regarding a single controversy (the decision for a city to stop traffic on Sundays, or for a 
country to enter a war, for instance). We are going to call for the sake of simplicity “extremists” the 
people having an opinion close to one of the two extremes and “neutrals” those who do not take 
side. We would like to stress that “neutral” does not mean “moderate”, for instance belonging to a 
centre party in the left-right arrangement of political parties in Europe. “Moderates” have usually 
very strong opinions that they are willing to defend and spread. In the context of our model we 
consider “neutrals” people that do not have opinions, at least on selected topics. From the point of 
view of elections, neutrals are those who do not vote because they do not care about, not those who 
are voting for the moderate parties. 
 
Deffuant [7] introduces also the concept of bounded confidence: two persons interact only if the 
distance between their opinions is lower than a given tolerance threshold. Furthermore, the opinions 
converging mechanism due to the social influence, in the model, is a symmetric drift of both the 
agents in the direction of an intermediate opinion.  
 
In this paper we would like to introduce a more complex but to our advice also more realistic 
description. In our model the tolerance threshold and the drift indicator are not considered uniform 
values over the entire population but are rather different for each person [8] according to its opinion 
[9]: the stronger the opinion of an individual, the more it will prefer to discuss only with people 
sharing similar ideas. A neutral position on a certain topic is usually determined by a lack of 
knowledge that would lead neutrals to interact with a wider range of opinions and to be easily 
persuaded by stronger viewpoints. On the other side, extremists are less tolerant and much more 
confident of their opinions (like the inflexible minorities in [10]). 
 
Deffuant model has been applied to several kinds of social structures: from all-to-all networks in 
which every couple of agents can interact with each other, to lattices where the number of neighbors 
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with whom is possible to interact is fixed [7], to networks where the number of neighbors has a 
more complex distribution [11].  
In all these cases the structure of the network was considered only as the framework for the opinion 
evolution and it was not influenced by the opinion of the single social actors: the extremist could a 
priori have the same connections (both qualitatively and quantitatively) as a completely neutral 
person. This situation is not realistic since in many different fields, and in many different social 
networks a strong segregation effect is observed: in urban areas such as in web communities, people 
with very similar traits that are too distant from the average of the community, tend to build their 
own sub-communities. [12,13]. 
 
In our model we take into account also the effect of the opinion on the network structure, 
introducing a social network construction mechanism describing segregation process. The 
mechanism that leads individuals to choose acquaintances with very similar cultural, religious or 
racial traits, causing the formation of strongly connected opinion communities is called homophily 
[14,15,16 ,17]. We will model this phenomenon introducing an opinion dependent homophily: 
during the first phase of network formation extremists will choose to be more likely surrounded by 
persons sustaining their opinions while neutrals will not have prejudice in forming links with 
anybody. The architecture of the links is fixed and is not changing during the opinion evolution, 
occurring when the network is completely formed. The architecture is then determined by the 
different starting opinions. This situation correspond to a rapid opinion evolution during which the 
social links are not rewired. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: in section 2 and 3 we describe the algorithms that we use to 
construct the interaction network and to model the opinion dynamics.  
In section 4 we show the numerical results of the opinion propagation: how the opinion dependent 
homophily in the network structure and the opinion dependent tolerance in the opinion dynamics 
can lead to different convergence scenarios. We observe that in societies where the extremists self-
segregate pluralism is never achieved, because when extremists are less confident in their ideas, the 
opinion of all the agents always converge to an uniform opinion, while if they are more confident, 
only very small and isolated groups of extremists survive. Pluralism is reached only when the 
extremists are integrated in the society but are simultaneously strongly convinced of their ideas: this 
is the only case in which many different opinions persist at the end of the simulation.  
 
2- Methods 1: Social structure 
 
Each simulation is divided into two parts. First, the social structure network is formed, i.e. we 
determine the links connecting the different individuals. Then, the structure is keep fixed and we let 
the opinions of the individuals interact, but no link is formed or destroyed. In this section we 
describe the formation of the social network. 
If the number of agents was sufficiently small, i.e. if we were dealing with a small social 
aggregation (the students of a class, the colleagues of a small company, a small village…) it would 
have been a good approximation to consider that all the agents interact with each other. In this case 
the agents form a complete clique: the structure of a similar society is a completely connected graph 
and all the nodes have the same number of connections (degree). The fact that all agents interact 
does not mean that all interaction are identical: different intensities can be associated to different 
links but in this paper we are not going to deepen on this topic. 
We are not adopting this approach, since all-to-all connections models can not be used for bigger 
societies where the agents are not able to interact directly with all the others. However we will show 
in section 4.2 that our results are valid also in this kind of networks.  
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In many realistic social networks a strong heterogeneity in the degree is observed: most of the 
agents have a small number of contacts but there is also a significant number of nodes with many 
connections.  
This behaviour can be explained, for example, with the preferential attachment model introduced by 
Barabasi and Albert [18]: starting from an initial core, at each step a new agent gets connected to m 
pre-existing agents. The targets of the new connections are selected with a probability that is 
proportional to the degree of the old nodes. In this way, along the growth process, the most 
connected agents will become more and more connected, while the more isolated ones remain 
always less attractive. 
The idea is that persons with more relations are more likely to have new relations: your friends 
introduce to you new friends, while when you are in an environment with no friends it is difficult to 
start. Such a procedure generates a degree distribution that, when the number of nodes becomes big 
enough, is a power-law with exponent γ=-3: P(k)=k -3 (where k is the degree, and P(k) the 
probability of finding nodes with degree k). 
 
The Barabasi-Albert model provides a basic description for many natural and artificial systems but 
it is not fully exhaustive for modelling social interactions. 
The process we would like to describe in this paper is the use of social attitude, and in particular 
opinion affinity, as a preferential mechanism for building social connections [19]: in social 
frameworks individuals who share common interests and ideals tend to be strongly connected 
between them and to form distinct communities. In particular, a phenomenon that is largely 
observed in various social structures and at all the possible scales (from internet community to big 
cities structure) is the segregation process: famous example at urban level are the “Ghettos” in the 
US metropolis and the “Banlieues” in the French cities that are communities built on social and 
economical stratification. 
Segregation is a mechanism that tend to favor the creation of links between those members of a 
society whose characteristic traits are distant from the average of the community.  
 
Three different mechanisms can generate segregation. Segregation can be imposed by external 
factors: in many countries there are laws allowing only some specific ethnic communities to live in 
given areas, or confining other communities, and rent price gradient has often practically the same 
effect. A mixed network can spontaneously become a become a segregated one thanks to rewiring 
[20], for example when people choose to live among those who share similar opinion (“The Big 
Sort” in The economist, June 19th 2008). 
Finally, segregation can also result directly by the same generation process of the social network, in 
this case we can speak of self-segregation like, for example, in the case of ethnic or religious 
communities or some extreme political organizations. 
We consider this last mechanism and we build a network model according to these assumptions. 
Self-segregation is generated by the fact that individuals that are far from the main opinion in their 
community (extremists), rely much on their identity in social interactions, so choose a criterion 
strongly based on the homophily to select their contacts. On the other side agents with neutral 
opinion, do not have a priori prejudices in choosing new connections. In order to model the 
segregated structure, we keep into account the dependence of the homophily on opinion and, in the 
inclusion mechanism of a new agent, we consider a probability function that depends on these 
different attitudes.  
 
We consider a continuous opinion model where the opinion of each agent is randomly extracted in 
the range [-1,1]. We start form an initial core of randomly connected nodes and then, at each step of 
the network formation process we connect a new node to m pre-existing nodes with the following 
algorithm: 
• A random opinion is associated to the new agent, oN 
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• The new agent connects to the pre-existing agents with a probability: 
 
P(N→i) ≈ ki *Exp[-β|oN||oN-oi|]         (1) 
 
where ki is the degree of the pre-existing agent.  
 
The exponential function that appears in the connection probability (that is displayed in figure 1) 
can assume values in between 1 and 0 and reproduces the requests that we listed before. The 
“homophily parameter” β modules how agents are strict in the choice of their relational approaches: 
if β=0 the model reduces to the Barabasi-Albert network where the extremists are completely 
inserted inside the society. For β>0 the probability of interacting between two agents is maximal if 
they have exactly the same opinion (since oN-oi=0 and the exponential becomes 1) and decreases 
(with a slope depending on β) for more distant opinions. For large values of β, the extremist will 
connect only to the very similar agents, creating their own communities and avoiding the mixing 
with the rest of the society. On the opposite, independently from β, the neutral agents, will not have 
any preclusion to link to anybody because when oN=0 the exponential is equal to the maximum 
value 1 for any value of the other parameters.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Homophily in network formation. Probability of connection between the new node (N) 
and a node (i) already included in the network as a function of their opinion. The left plot is realized 
with a parameter β=2 in Equation 1, and the right one for β=10. 
 
 
As reported in figure 2, such kind of construction gives rise to a scale free network, i.e. to a power 
law distribution of the degree probability, with a cut-off appearing only for extremely high values of 
β (β>20). But even if such process preserves the same degree distribution of the Barabasi-Albert 
network, the clustering structure changes with increasing values of the parameter. To measure the 
level of cliquishness in the graph we used the following clustering coefficient: for each vertex the 
clustering coefficient is given by the effective number of links between the neighbourhood divided 
by the total number of links that could possibly exist between all of them. This measure is one if the 
neighbours form a complete clique, while it is zero if they are completely disconnected. 
As can be noticed in the figure the clustering coefficient increases with β, suggesting the creation of 
more and more separated opinion communities. 
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 Figure 2: Network structure. Degree distribution (left plot) and clustering coefficient as a function 
of the degree (right plot) for a network of 10000 nodes and for different values of β. The result is 
averaged over 100 realizations of the network.  
  
 
The discussion on community detection inside a network is a popular topic in the recent network 
theory literature [21,22]. We are not interested to deal with such topological structure, so we use a 
very simple tool to analyze if the network effectively shows a segregated structure according to the 
opinion dependent homophyliac process that we described before. In figure 3 we plot the opinion 
couples (oi,oj) for all the possible i,j neightbours (black points). In the same graph we plot the 
binned data for the opinion versus the average value of the opinion of neighbours, for different 
values of β (continuous line).  
As we can notice, for β>0 the extremists agents neighbors, on average, have their same opinions; in 
this sense we say that the extremists tend to self-segregate.  
 
The process we have described sets the initial conditions for the opinion evolution. It is important to 
stress that in the present network the social network structure is stable, i.e. links remain the same 
thorough the opinion evolution, even if their strength and efficiency can vary, as described in the 
next section.  
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Figure 3: Neighbours opinion at the end of network formation. The continuous line represents the 
average opinion of the neighbours of an agent as a function of the opinion of the agent. The three 
plots correspond to three different values of the parameter. The black points represent all the 
couples (oi, oj) for all the links of the network.  
 
 
3- Methods 2: Opinion Dynamics 
 
Once that the network is formed, we let the individuals interact, i.e. at each step the opinion of each 
individual changes, becoming more similar to the opinion of its neighbours with some conditions 
that are the subject of this section. When all the opinions have been updated the interactions start 
again until a stable opinion configurations is obtained. This is a well known procedure [7]. 
The modification that we introduced in our model aimed to take in account that not all the 
individuals interact have the same efficacy in changing the other individuals opinion, and this is 
often due to the strength of the starting opinions of both parties. 
Nixon introduced the idea of “Silent majority” (3 nov 1969) to convince US citizens that all of 
those who were not expressing an opinion on Vietnam war were in fact supporting the war. In a 
correct picture, however, if an individual is neither expressing nor acting to support any opinion on 
a particular topic, we must consider this individual with no opinion, neutral. This is usually caused 
by a mix of a lack of interest, due to the perception that involvement is not going to cause any 
consequence on one's life, and a lack of information on the different positions.  
We try to explain the ideas originating our model of opinion propagation with the example of a 
presidential campaign. When neutrals, people who have not yet taken position, get in touch with 
strongly motivated people, supporters of one candidate, they can easily change their mind since they 
do not have any firm idea. But i) the motivated people are not going to weaken their opinion after 
this interaction, so the interaction is asymmetric, ii) if it is relatively easy to take a position, 
dismissing it once that one is convinced is far harder, so sensitivity depends on the strength of one's 
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opinion. Finally, in the presidential campaign example, it is clear that if neutrals will initially listen 
to everybody to decide with position to take, and everybody is going to try to convince them, 
supporters of a party will not waste time going to discuss in other parties headquarters, so iii) the 
range of interactions is larger when the opinion is weaker and vice versa. 
All these assumptions on the different interacting attitudes for radicals and neutrals can be 
connected to a well known concept in social psychology:  the social identity [23,24]. People that 
more strongly support a position are usually part of groups, parties or, in any case they feel to be 
part of a collective organism. This fact increase the self-esteem of the individual and then the 
strength with whom he/she defends the supported position. Simultaneously the more the 
identification process is strong, stronger will also be the intergroup discrimination and the denial of 
other ideologies.    
To model these 3 factors we introduced a parameter α, ranging from 0 to 1, measuring the role of 
sensitivity in the interactions.  
First of all we define an opinion dependent tolerance threshold: 
 
ti=1-α|oi|      (2) 
 
In this way the interaction range varies with the opinion (with a strength depending on α)  to 
represent the interaction limitations of extremists. This is in our opinion the simplest function 
capturing the features we are interested in: the threshold varies linearly with both opinion and 
strength, perfect extremists (|oi|=1) interact with nobody and perfect neutrals (|oi|=0) interact with 
everybody. 
Two agents interact only if they are connected by a link and if:  
 
|oj-oi|<min(ti,tj)        (3) 
 
If α =0 we have a uniform interaction range of 1 (half of the complete opinion range). In any case 
the range does not depend on α for neutral agents (o=0), while for instance strong extremists of both 
sides (|o|=1) will talk to nobody if α =1 and to a range of 0.5 if α =0.5. 
 
The amount of the opinion modification following an interaction depends on the individual 
tolerance, to represent the fact that extremists are less likely to change their mind  
 
Δoi=ti*(oj-oi)/2        (4) 
 
If α =0 any interaction will end with the two nodes sharing the same average opinion, while for α>0 
the modification is reduced. For any value of α, after an interaction, a neutral agent (o=0) will move 
half way toward the opinion of the other interacting node, but the modification of any node with 
|o|>0 would be progressively reduced by the (1- α|o|) factor when α or |o| is increased. 
Notice that, for α =0, our model reduces to the standard Deffuant model with confidence parameter 
ε=1 [7]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4- Numerical results  
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The model we introduced has two main parameters: a structural parameter β that modules how the 
(opinion dependent) homophily influences the network construction and a dynamical parameter α 
that connects the tolerance of each agent to its opinion and determine the possibility to modify its 
opinion. We observed the effect of each parameter on the dynamics of the opinion performing 
simulations with different values of α and β on a population of Nag=1000 agents. For the 
evolutionary process, at each time step we update, one by one and in a random order, the opinions 
of the single agents (asynchronous update). We will first present some qualitative results, to give an 
idea of the dynamics, presenting statistics in the next section. 
 
We start considering two extremes values of α, α=0 (classic Deffuant model) and α=1 (in which 
opinion and tolerance are most related) for different values of β. 
The results are displayed in Figures 4 and 5 . 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Results of opinion dynamics with α=0 (tolerance and interaction do not depend on 
opinion) on network structures built with different values of β. Each line represents the opinion 
evolution of one agent. Only a subset of 100 agents out of 1000 is displayed. The plot is the sketch 
of one realization of the simulation.  
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Figure 5: Results of opinion dynamics with α=1 (tolerance and interaction strongly depend on 
opinion) on network structures built with different values of β. Each line represents the opinion 
evolution of one agent. Only a subset of 100 agents out of 1000 is displayed. The plot is the sketch 
of one realization of the simulation.  
 
 
For α=0 (figure 4) the opinion evolution process is exactly the basic Deffuant model with the 
tolerance parameter fixed to 0.5: independently from the structure of the social interactions we 
always obtain the convergence to the average opinion. The level of segregation of the community 
does not alter the final result but only the convergence time to such situation. If β is bigger, the 
opinion converges in a longer time because the average opinion difference between neighbours is 
smaller, and as consequence the average modification per step is smaller, so a higher number of 
steps is required to reach uniformity.  
 
 
The result is completely different for α=1 (figure 5). In this case the tolerance of each agent 
depends on its opinion: the extremists are more convinced of their own ideas, they interact only 
with similar people and they feel less the bias of the other’s opinion. 
Under these conditions the global consensus is never reached but different behaviors can be 
observed depending on the segregation level. When the value of β is large (β=50), i.e. extremists 
are also topologically segregated, the consensus is almost reached apart from some small groups of 
extremists that maintain their opinion: a large central majority cluster is observed but also a small 
group whose opinion lies at the extremes of the interval form opinion clusters.  
When β goes to zero the network structure is a Barabasi-Albert network and consequently the 
extremists are completely integrated with the society. In this case the consensus is far from being 
realized: many smaller opinion minorities are formed and a wide range of opinions is present at the 
end of the evolution. 
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Similar considerations can be done on the effect of the dynamical parameter. In Figures 6 and 7 we 
show the plots regarding the opinion evolution for different values of α for two extreme values of β, 
β=0 and β=50. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Results of opinion evolution on networks built with β=0 (Barabasi Albert network) for 
dynamics using different values of α. Each line represents the opinion evolution of one agent. Only 
a subset of 100 agents out of 1000 is displayed. The plot is the sketch of one realization of the 
simulation. 
 
If we consider an opinion independent link structure, β=0 (figure 6), we notice that, varying the 
parameter α different results are obtained: as we already observed, if α=0 the consensus is rapidly 
reached. Increasing the parameter α leads to a larger number of opinion minorities.  
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Figure 7: Results of opinion evolution on networks built with β=50 (strong homophily) for 
dynamics using different values of α. Each line represents the opinion evolution of one agent. Only 
a subset of 100 agents out of 1000 is displayed. The plot is the sketch of one realization of the 
simulation. 
 
 
On the contrary, for β=50, for most of the range of α the consensus is reached and only for α=1, 
small groups of extremists survive the uniform consensus process.  
In fact, for large values of β the network structure is strongly correlated to the initial opinions of the 
agents. Such correlation allows the existence of gradual paths of communication that always lead to 
convergence. 
The survival of side clusters for α=1 (where the tolerance is strongly dependent on the opinion) is 
due to the fact that, in this situation, the most extremist agents are not involved in the global opinion 
dynamics process since their tolerance is too small to interact with someone that is far from their 
ideas; they just interact with the most similar agents creating a sort of opinion niches. 
 
For large values of α a non-consensus situation is observed independently from β, but the 
correlation between the opinions and the network structure at the end of the simulation strongly 
depends on β: in Figure 8 we plot the opinion of each agent vs the opinion of her neighbours for 
β=0 and β=10. For β=0 the extremist agents have neighbours with all the possible available 
positions, while for β=10, also at the end of the simulation a segregated structure for the radicals 
positions is observed: they only have link between agents with very similar opinions.  
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Figure 8: Neighbours opinion at the end of the opinion dynamics process. The three plots 
correspond to three different values of the parameter β. The points represent all the couples (oi,o) 
for all the links of the network. 
4.1 Statistical measures  
 
To define opinion clusters we use the procedure described in [25]: a cluster is a group of agents 
such that, for each couple of agents in the group, there is a chain of intermediate agents whose 
opinion differs less than a given threshold. We fix the threshold to be s=0.01. We measure clusters 
only at the end of the simulation, when a steady state is reached, and consider an opinion cluster 
only a group of more than one agent.  
Notice that, differently by the definition of clusters used in percolation theory, in our notion of 
clusters no information on the topological structure is contained: we are defining opinion clusters 
that contains agents with very similar opinions but that a priori do not have particular neighbouring 
properties on the network. 
The basic measure to describe the dynamical process is the number of clusters (ncl). But we also 
need to introduce some indicators for the cluster structure. The giant opinion cluster is the largest 
cluster of agents sharing the same opinion. We will use as an indicator for the dynamics the size of 
the relative giant cluster size, namely, the giant cluster size normalized with the total number of 
agents (gdim):  
 
gdim=(nag in the giant cluster) / Nag
 
If all the agents converge to the same opinion the normalized giant cluster has size gdim=1 while, on 
the other extreme, if all the agents have a different opinion gdim=1/N.  
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It is also useful to introduce the average secondary cluster dimension, that is sum of  the relative 
average dimension of the second and third largest clusters. To estimate the indicators we will 
perform some experiments on a population of Nag=1000 agents for different values of the 
parameter; to produce a reliable statistics, for each set of parameters, we consider 10 different initial 
conditions (stochastic realizations of the network) and on each of these realizations we run the 
opinion dynamics for 10 different times. The final result is averaged over all the 100 trials.  
 
Figure 9 shows the result of the simulations as a function of β for fixed values of α. For all the 
values of α the number of clusters decreases with β: as β gets bigger (namely the extremists are 
more segregated at the beginning) the number of opinions available at the end of the simulation is 
much lower than those we had at the beginning. In particular for α < 0.9 and sufficiently large 
values of β, the opinions converge to uniformity. This happens because when α>0 for every agent 
the set of nodes with whom interaction is possible is reduced, and if an extremist is surrounded by 
neighbours with opinions out of the reach of its tolerance, it can not interact and reach the giant 
cluster. But as β is increased so is the possibility of having neighbours with similar opinions and 
therefore to find the way toward the giant cluster.  
In Figure 9C, for α= 0.8, a characteristic behaviour of the secondary cluster size as a function of β 
is observed: it presents a clear maximum for β∼3. The explanation is that if β is too small (β<3) 
extremists are set apart from each other and so is higher the possibility for them to be surrounded by 
neighbours with whom interaction is impossible. As a consequence, if consensus is impossible, 
even a large opposition cluster can not be formed.  
 
 
 
Figure 9: Cluster statistics for different values of α as a function of the static parameter β. 
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Relative size of the giant cluster (A), number of clusters (B) and average secondary cluster size (C). 
Results are averaged over 100 simulations. 
 
In Figure 10, instead, we describe the behaviour of the indicators as a function of the dynamical 
parameter α for fixed values of β.  
The number of clusters, for every value of β, increases with α, and consequently the giant cluster 
size decreases. For each value of β there is a critical value of the dynamical parameter α, αc, such 
that for α<αc (when the tolerance is less depending on the opinion) the system converges to a single 
opinion while, for α>αc the final state shows a larger number of opinion clusters. However, we find 
again in Fig 10C that for low values of β the maximum size of the extremists cluster is reached for 
an optimal value of α. This is because when β is small (extremist randomly linked with all the other 
agents) and α is large (extremist tolerance is small) extremists can find again themselves 
surrounded by neighbours with milder opinions, with whom they can not interact, and therefore can 
not find the way to be connected to the cluster formed by the other extremists, while if α is low 
consensus is achieved. 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Cluster statistics for different values of β as a function of the dynamical parameter α. 
Giant cluster dimension (A), number of clusters (B) and extremist cluster dimension (C). Results 
are averaged over 100 simulations. 
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4.2 Robustness of the results changing the network topology 
 
Some additional considerations should be added about the influence of the network topology on the 
result.  It has been proved that in Deffuant model the presence of a scale free network does not 
influence the results about the phase transition from a consensus scenario to a fragmented one: 
independently from the network structure (random graph, lattice or scale free), and also in the case 
of the fully connected structure (Mean Field approach) the transition point is reached when the 
parameter of the bounded confidence is ε=0.5 [26]. 
Also this model presents this kind of robustness regarding to the topological choices. For these 
analysis We will focus on the measure of the average relative giant cluster size. 
First of all we implement a mean field approach. In this case the segregation effect is not expressed, 
like in the case with β=0 (opinion independent scale free network). The only difference between the 
mean field case and the scale free network is the degree distribution. As displayed in figure 11,  in 
the case of the mean field and in the case of a scale free network, the curves of s with respect to α 
present a very good superposition. 
 
Figure 11: Giant cluster dimension vs α for a complete graph and an opinion dependent scale free 
structure with β=0. Each point is obtained as the average of 100 simulations with 1000 agents. 
 
Also the presence of a scale free structure is not fundamental for the final result. In this case we 
perform the same analysis about the dependence of the giant cluster size from α, for an opinion 
dependent network with β=3, in the scale free (1) case and in the case when the degree dependence 
of the connection probability is relaxed: 
 
P(N→i) ≈ Exp[-β|oN||oN-oi|] 
 
As observed in figure 12, also in this case a very good superposition is observed. 
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 Figure 12: Giant cluster dimension vs α for an opinion dependent scale free structure  and an 
opinion dependent random degree structure, both with β=3. Each point is obtained as the average of 
100 simulations with 1000 agents. 
 
4.3 Convergence types 
 
 
In our simulations we studied the conditions needed to realize opinion uniformity. We think 
anyhow that in a social perspective the absence of uniformity does not automatically imply the 
presence of a real pluralism, i.e. the presence of many subjects able to influence the public scene.  
For this reason we compared in the previous section the size of the majority cluster and the size of 
the secondary cluster. Another possible measure of pluralism is the number of opinion clusters 
surviving in the stable state. According to these measure we can identify three different 
convergence types: 
 
• Uniformity: all the agents converge to the same opinion and only one cluster is present. 
• Strong majority: almost all the agents converge to the average opinion but few (ncl<nthr) 
extremist clusters remains. 
• Pluralism: many different clusters (ncl>nthr) remain and a wide range of stable opinions is 
observed after the dynamical process. 
 
We set nthr = 5. 
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Figure 13: Different regimes identified by number of clusters as a function of (α,β). Each point is 
obtained as the average of 25 simulations with 1000 agents. 
 
Figure 13 shows how different convergence regimes can be realized for different values of the 
parameter space: low values of the dynamical parameter α (α<0.2) lead to uniformity independently 
of the topological structure. For small values of β (β->0, namely the standard Barabasi – Albert 
network model), a small deviation of the dynamical model from the Deffuant’s (α=0) is enough to 
guarantee the presence of more than one opinion at the end of the opinion evolution. On the 
opposite, when the network starts to exhibit a strongly segregated structure, there is no way to avoid 
the uniformity apart from very high values of α (α>0.8). When a treshold value of β (∼10), is 
crossed, the transition between the uniform and the strong majority regimes is realized at the same 
value of α, the critical value αC that we identified in Figure 10.  
 
A situation where a large number of opinion remains available (pluralism) can be realized only in a 
very particular case: small β and large α. This convergence type can be observed in Figure 10C: for 
β=2, this is the α-range where the secondary cluster size starts to decrease after a flat zone 
corresponding to the strong majority area.  
In these conditions the extremist agents are neither able to interact with all their neighbours that, 
since β is small can, have very different opinions, neither to create minority clusters. This situation 
is the optimal one for the opinion preservation since it leads to the formation of clusters different 
from the majority consensus even for non-extreme opinions. 
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5-Conclusions 
 
Different social dynamics arise from the implementation of our algorithms of segregation.  
A non trivial result is that opinion dependent homophily, i.e. the fact that extremists prefer to form 
links with people sharing similar ideas while neutrals do not consider the opinion of other people 
while forming a link, is in fact not preventing the formation of a uniform consensus, but only 
making its realization slower (Fig.4). On the contrary, when also opinion dependent tolerance and 
sensitivity are introduced, the topological segregation actually helps the formation of a large 
majority cluster (Fig.5). Opinion dependent homophily and opinion dependent sensitivity are two 
mechanisms that seem to work in the same direction, i.e. forming isolated clusters of extremists, but 
when combined neutralize each other and result in the reduction or even in the absence of 
extremists clusters. For instance, in Figure 13, if we set β=0 and we increase α up to 0.6 the system 
goes from uniformity to strong majority to pluralism, but if at this point we increase β, increasing 
the starting segregation of the opinions, we come back first to strong majority and then to 
uniformity. This counter-intuitive result is easy to understand if one thinks that the tendency to form 
links with people similar to you ensure that you are never going to be isolated, and in this way the 
dialogue can continue to shape the different opinions and to make them closer. 
 
Making the extremists less tolerant and sensitive to different opinions predictably results in a 
reduced size of the majority cluster. If the process is pushed too far extremists do not form even 
minority cluster and remain simply isolated. The formation of self-referring opinion fringes is 
indeed a very common phenomenon. The price these small groups pay for their isolation is simply 
the impossibility to efficiently influence the society. In this perspective the most interesting feature 
is the one we see in Fig.10C: for low values of β there is an optimal value of α maximizing the size 
of minority clusters. We can see this combination of parameters as the rise of a “second opinion” 
(and maybe third, fourth, and so on) effectively separated from the majority consensus and at the 
same time able to affect society thanks to its size. 
 
Due to the initial opinion distribution and to the fact that agents with a more neutral opinion have a 
larger range of interaction, nodes on average will weaken their opinions at each step for any value 
of the parameters. What prevents then the formation of a uniform consensus for some parameter 
values? If at any moment there is a node whose neighbours with a milder opinion are all at a 
distance larger than its tolerance, this node will be forever isolated from the majority, and uniform 
consensus will never be reached. We saw that increasing β the possibility for this to happen is 
decreasing, because neighbours will in most cases share similar opinions, while on the opposite 
increasing α will decrease the tolerance ranges and make isolation more probable. For this reason, 
for sufficiently high α there is a critical value of β for which isolation appears and uniformity 
breaks down, and this value is rapidly diverging when α is increased. This phase transition, 
happening when the opinion space is not “fully connected” anymore, happens at the border of the 
black and red areas in Fig.13. Furthermore, we can see also the formation of minority clusters in the 
same way, since it depends on whether the set of the extremists is fully connected or not.  
 
The influence of  minorities in the construction of public opinion has been thorough analyzed by 
sociologist, using empirical methods. In 1969 an experiment was performed about how the response 
in the perception of a color of a majority changes in presence of a minority [27].  This and other 
subsequent experiments confirmed that the efficiency of minority influence definitely depends on 
the behavioural styles of the minorities. 
In particular Moscovici theory of minority influence [28,29] is based on the fact that a minority 
source (that never yield or compromise) enhances influence in a debate if it demonstrates to be 
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always consistent: its consistency conveys information to its position and it is able to generate in the 
recipients a higher level of conflict with the majority source.  
This is comparable with our result that a non-consensus situation, where minority clusters are 
present, can be realized only after the critical point in α, the parameter that tunes the level of 
inflexibility of the extremists.  
An other important aspect about the negative back-reaction of a too strong consistency is underlined 
in [29-31]: when the recipients perceive in the minority a “dogmatic” attitude, they will be less 
disposed to debate. This assumption is again in good agreement with our model where a optimal 
value of α was identified for the creation of cohesive minorities clusters. 
Apart from consistency, an other factor results to be important for the influence of minority sources:  
their dissimilarity from the majority target. A clear distinction is present between the influence of 
in-group and out-group minorities [32,33].  In this sense, the so called “deviant” minorities, those 
which are not considered part of the society, face much higher difficulties to gain consensus. This 
concept is represented in our model by the fact that the non-consensus phase is much easier to be 
reached for low values of the segregation parameter β. 
 
Finally, in this paper we hypothesized that extremists with distant opinions are not interacting. What 
would be interesting is to implement a negative interaction, i.e. an interaction between extremists 
that is reinforcing, instead of weakening, the respective opinions. A very common example is the 
reaction mechanism with whom an opinion minority tolerated by the common consensus becomes 
more segregated if tolerance turns into widespread hostility. 
Another assumption that we did in this paper is that the opinion dynamics happens rapidly so that 
we can consider the social network as a static framework. On the other side, to consider a slow 
process where the agents adapt their opinions according to the social background, we should keep 
into account the feedback mechanism that the dynamical process has on the network structure itself 
[34,35]. In forthcoming projects we will consider what changes in the opinion dynamics when the 
social relationships naturally evolve in time according to the opinion changes of the agents.   
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